“Dieselgate” is one name being given to the scandal that is shaming Volkswagen, the world’s highest-revenue vehicle manufacturer. This blog summarizes the facts, then poses and tries to answer the pressing questions that the VW cheat raises.
Science Fact: There are many news articles dissecting the VW cheat from any perspective that you prefer:
– Business ethics (Financial Times)
– Government’s role in regulation (New York Times)
– European politics (Fox News)
– VW cheat discovery by a nonprofit, a university and government agencies (Bloomberg) (Note: As of Aug 26, 2017, Bloomberg has restricted this article to their subscribers.)
– Car industry anxieties (Car Magazine UK)
– A finger-wagging dissection of VW’s TDI (Turbo Diesel Injection) advertisements (Time)
New revelations are occurring almost daily in this story. However, it will be years before all the implications of the VW cheat come to light. Along the way, we can expect a fifty-page article in the New Yorker magazine; several tell-all “exposé” books; a multi-part TV documentary; a star-studded Hollywood movie; and eventually, a Harvard Business School Case Study. But already, it’s reasonable to ask: What happened? How did it happen? And how does that affect our everyday lives?
I have collected here the bare facts about the VW cheat, to make sure we have the same starting position. Then I’ll present the questions that occurred to me, and try to answer them for you.
VW Cheat – Just the Facts, Ma’am
For a half-dozen years VW has been extensively advertising its super-clean high-MPG small diesel engines, the TDI 2.0 (liter) and the TDI 1.6. Clean exhaust and efficient operation are conflicting requirements for diesel engines, which can best be met by large engines for trucks. Nevertheless, VW seemed to have found the sweet spot with its proprietary design and engine control software.
A nonprofit organization, the International Council on Clean Transportation, wanted to use VW’s accomplishment to persuade European regulators to adopt tighter emission controls, similar to those in the U.S. So ICCT hired researchers to collect data on low-emission performance by VW and BMW vehicles.
Most emissions tests are performed in a laboratory, with the car running on a chassis dynamometer, a sort of treadmill. However, ICCT wanted more realistic data, reflecting true highway conditions. So in 2013 they issued a contract to the Center for Alternative Fuels, Engines and Emissions (CAFEE) at West Virginia University. Their laboratory includes a variety of vehicle testing equipment, including portable equipment that can measure emissions while a car is actually being driven.
CAFEE tested three diesel vehicles for ICCT: a 2012 VW Jetta, a 2013 VW Passat and a 2012 BMW X5. All three had been lab-certified to the tight emission standards of the California Air Resources Board (CARB). However, on the road the Jetta emitted 15 to 35 times the allowable limit of nitrogen oxides, and the Passat 5 to 20 times the limit. The BMW emissions on the highway remained under the CARB limits.
Since only three cars were tested, the published reports did not disclose the make or model of the cars tested; after all, the vehicles that failed the test might have had some unidentified rare defect that made them not representative of their model type. However, the conference was co-sponsored by CARB and by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), so scientists from both organizations would have been present in the audience. And someone had the wit to ask the question, OK, which specific cars did you test?
The regulatory agencies don’t do very much of their own testing. They rely on self-reporting by vehicle manufacturers, who supposedly follow EPA’s vehicle testing procedures. But when EPA and CARB were alerted that two VW diesel cars had spectacularly failed their emissions road tests, they spent the next year intensively testing various VW models in their own laboratories and questioning VW about the results.
At first, VW claimed that the poor emissions results were the result of errors in their engine control software. In December 2014 they recalled 500,000 vehicles for reprogramming. However, EPA testing still showed emissions above legal requirements.
EPA then took a very sophisticated tack: they studied VW’s engine control software, some millions of lines of code. They discovered a subroutine that sent suspicious commands to the emissions controls. EPA confirmed the cheat by adjusting their lab tests to pretend that the car was on the highway: its emissions immediately zoomed up. With this (literally) smoking gun in hand, EPA told VW that it would not certify its 2016 models for sale in the US unless this problem was resolved.
The threat of non-certification, which would have blocked all sales of new VW diesel cars in the US, was so scary that VW gave up. EPA’s letter to VW states that VW’s car computers were programmed to operate in two different modes: a “dyno calibration” that adjusted engine settings during laboratory tests, and a “road calibration” giving different settings for normal driving. The lab settings minimized nitrogen oxide emissions; the normal driving settings maximized fuel economy and performance, at the price of substantially increased emissions. The EPA refers to VW’s “dyno calibration” software as a “defeat device” intended to cheat the tests.
It’s now being claimed that VW was warned by supplier Bosch in 2007 and by its own employees in 2011 about the illegality of its actions.
VW Cheat – The Fallout
The VW cheat undermines public trust in the Volkswagen company, which has so proudly trumpeted its clean diesel cars. It may also make the public mistrustful of all diesel cars. Even worse, the VW cheat calls into question the ethics of the automotive industry and the regulatory process that supposedly protects the public.
The immediate implications of the VW cheat are startling:
– The 482,000 “clean diesel” vehicles VW has sold in the US could lead to a US fine of up to $37,500 per vehicle, a total of $18 billion; for comparison, VW’s total profit for the year 2014 was $12 billion.
– Since 11 million vehicles world-wide have the VW cheat software, fines from other countries could be as large or larger.
– Criminal prosecution of individuals at VW is possible.
– Civil lawsuits have been filed by owners of VW diesel cars.
– VW’s CEO has resigned, and it is rumored that three additional board members may resign.(Car Magazine UK) And more “heads are rolling”: several executives, including two top R&D managers, have been fired.
– VW’s stock price dropped by one-third within four days after the VW cheat was exposed.
VW Cheat – Affected Vehicles
An article in Vox.com article lists the following US cars that are likely to be recalled to correct the VW cheat: 2009-2015 VW Beetle 2.0L TDI; 2009-2015 VW Golf 2.0L TDI; 2009-2015 VW Jetta 2.0L TDI; 2009-2015 Audi A3 2.0L TDI; and 2014-2015 VW Passat 2.0L TDI. This list is similar to a list contained in EPA’s letter to VW.
Science Speculation: As noted above, the VW cheat story has been reported from many different perspectives. However, there are still many unanswered questions. I will pose a few of them, and try to answer them for you:
VW Cheat – The Questions
How Does the Car Computer Know When the Car is in a Test Lab?
The computer in your car is often referred to as an Engine Control Unit, or ECU. It collects a great deal of information from sensors all over the car, and uses them not only to adjust the engine but also to alert you to problems via warning lights and diagnostic messages.
The essence of the VW cheat, as described by the EPA, is that the car’s computer knows when the car is in a test lab and temporarily re-tunes the engine for low emissions. At this time, only the software engineers at VW know exactly how the VW cheat was implemented.
Many possibilities have been suggested:
– One of CAFEE researchers suggests that the ECU could sense that the car’s hood is open for testing, or that the traction control unit was disabled, as required during dynamometer testing. (Note: As of Aug 26, 2017, Bloomberg has restricted this article to their subscribers.)
– If the front wheels are spinning but not the rear wheels, the car is being operated in a testing lab.
– The EPA tests are precisely defined, involving specific speeds, throttle settings and even steering wheel position; so it would be easy for the ECU to deduce that the car was undergoing a specific kind of test. Based on the EPA’s recently-revealed work, this is the most likely answer.
How Difficult is it to Re-Program the ECU?
Once the ECU has determined that the car is being tested, everyone agrees that it’s well within the capability of the ECU to perform the VW cheat. However, the estimate of programming difficulty depends on whether you ask a software expert or a vehicle engineer.
Here’s what the articles say:
– The EPA is quoted as calling the VW cheat a “sophisticated software algorithm.”
– Another article references VW’s “intricate code in its vehicle software that tracked steering and pedal movements.”
– ComputerWorld thinks that the VW cheat required only a “single line of code.”
How Widespread is Corporate Cheating, Anyway?
Dramatic crises like the VW cheat scandal force us to make comparisons. It’s a human survival instinct: we want to know whether we are witnessing a nuclear annihilation of traditional values that portends the imminent destruction of civilization; or simply the expected normal behavior of large corporations in which liability is limited and no one feels truly responsible.
Here are some examples of deceptions similar to the VW cheat, performed by other manufacturers:
– Last year, Hyundai and Kia were fined $100 million for reporting only their best mileage tests, achieved by testing with special tires and a tail wind.
– In the 1990s fines totaling $120 million were levied against Volvo, Renault, Caterpillar, Honda, GM, Ford and others for cheating on car and truck emissions testing with “defeat devices” similar to the VW cheat.
– Automotive companies routinely tape up car doors, overinflate tires and remove outside rear-view mirrors during testing. These steps reduce drag, allowing vehicles to perform better in testing than they do on the highway. Tricks like these help explain why your car never seems to get as many miles per gallon as the manufacturer advertised.
Therefore, the VW cheat is not VW’s own invention. It’s simply more blatant, more widely implemented, and more deceptively advertised than many of its forebears.
Deceptions like the VW cheat don’t give rise to lurid photographs of deadly chain-reaction collisions, because increased tailpipe emissions are not an immediate safety hazard. However, they increase air pollution, which in turn is estimated to cause 58,000 premature deaths per year in the US alone. The lack of bloody images means that the VW cheat is not causing the level of consumer attention evidenced by, say, Takata’s 34 million (potentially) exploding airbags or GM’s $900 million fine for faulty ignition switches.
There have been many safety recalls in recent years, but in most if not all cases the companies concerned did not intend to sell a hazardous vehicle. Some would argue that any safety defect represents misguided priorities by the company and is therefore both immoral and illegal. However, those who study the industry generally feel that the modern automobile is an exceedingly complex system which simply cannot be designed and built with zero flaws; and that the steady decline in fatalities per 100 million miles traveled attests to the fundamental soundness of our automotive safety regulatory process.
The same cannot be said for other industries. One of the New York Times articles recalls a 1999 earthquake in Turkey that killed 17,000 people. Many of the deaths were due to the total collapse of substandard buildings that had been constructed in blatant violation of building codes: for example, using too much sand in the concrete and omitting internal reinforcing rods. In contrast, this month a similar earthquake in Chile killed only 20 people, because in Chile building codes are strictly enforced.
Thus, while the VW cheat is certainly a big deal for Volkswagen, it does not cause the immediate tragic loss of life posed by some other types of company malfeasance.
What’s At Fault: Corporate Ethics or Lax Regulation?
The last worrisome question has to do with ethics and regulation. The VW cheat illustrates the conflict between short-term profit and long term risk; and the role of personal values within the business model that undergirds capitalism. There is no pat answer to this question, but we can illuminate it by seeing comments posted by the engaged and articulate readers of Financial Times and The Economist. The following are edited versions of the quotes that I find most illuminating.
First, from Financial Times:
– When are the EPA’s top management team resigning as well. Clearly, they failed their mission, they failed everybody who trusted the measuring system.
– We have always had corruption in certain countries but now a lack of moral integrity seems to pervade industry and commerce across the western world (I deliberately restrict my views to the western world). Banking is an obvious example but they are not alone.
– Maybe it is time for senior management contracts to include loss of all entitlements in the event of corporate misconduct?
– When I started work the best part of 50 years ago, ethical conduct was drummed into the professions and quasi-professions like banking as a set of principles on which one operated. …the rot set in when box ticking became the norm. …General principles have been forgotten.
– The line between moral and immoral needs to be redefined, not at the corporate boards but right at the kindergarten [level].
– Capitalism is about profits, not ethics. One needs to grasp that very basic point. There is no such thing as “social responsibility” if it hurts profitability.
– Whereas government is about power, not ethics.
– Sorry, you miss the point. Profits will have been seriously holed by this sorry episode. The question is of a short- or long-term view of profits.
– Many of the largest corporations will lie, cheat or steal if doing so enhances the bottom line. There is only one golden rule: don’t get caught.
– Given the EU is currently run as a German fiefdom, it will most likely slap VW’s wrist, conclude no one else was doing anything and go back to business as usual.
Plus these from The Economist:
– Ultimately, it’s a much bigger mess for Europe. Nearly half of all European passenger cars are diesel, versus a couple percent for the U.S. To boot, diesel is European auto manufacturer’s strength. Kill diesel, and you crush the European autos.
– GREED explains it all.
– In March a German government agency used a portable emission measurement system to test the ACTUAL NOx emissions of a BMW, a VW and a Mazda. All three of them failed. The Mazda spewed out fumes at up to 31 times the permitted (EU)-level. http://www.zeit.de/mobilitaet/2015-09/pems-abgasmessung-volkswagen [Google-translated version HERE]
These thoughtful voices illustrate the fundamental dilemma underlying industries and their regulation. There is no perfect mixture of ethics, values, priorities and role of government that will satisfy everyone, or be valid for all times. It is the job of corporate management, government leadership and the voice of the public to continually negotiate and re-negotiate the balance of power and responsibility that best serves the long-term interest of our human species.
How do you think the VW cheat ranks among corporate misdeeds? What role do you see for corporate social responsibility versus government regulation?
Drawing Credit: Adapted from PolyLingua, on openclipart.org